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                                                        1. 
 
  Peter Menzies’  work on causation includes a number of important contributions 
to our understanding of mental causation  and the causal exclusion argument.  I share 
with Peter the conviction that an interventionist account  of causation can cast new light 
on  this complex  of issues, but our views diverge in detail at several points. In this essay, 
I would like to briefly clarify my own views about mental causation and the exclusion 
argument, respond to some recent criticisms of those views, and then contrast  those 
views with somewhat different approach favored by Peter.  
 
2. 
 
  I assume that the exclusion argument is sufficiently well- known that  a detailed 
summary is unnecessary.  Following  Jaegwon Kim’s iconic diagram (Figure 1) , assume  
that M1 and M2 are mental properties or events and P1 and P2 their respective physical 
supervenience bases, with these supervenience relations represented by double-tailed 
arrows.  These supervenience relations are  understood in the way that is standard in non-
reductive physicalism: P1 is a realizer of   M1 but not identical with it and  P2 is a realizer 
of   M2 but is not identical with it. Assume also that P1 causes P2, as represented by the 
single-tailed arrow from P1 to P2.  The questions of interest  have to do with the causal 
role of M1 .  Given the above assumptions  is it correct to regard to  M1  as causing M2 or 
as causing  P2?    
 
 
 Figure 1 
 
According to the exclusion argument, as usually formulated,  the answer to both 
questions is “no”. Focusing for simplicity just on the issue of whether M1 causes M2, one 
version of  the  argument   runs roughly as follows: By the principle of the causal closure 
of the physical, P2 must have a   “sufficient” cause that is purely physical—assume 
without loss of generality that P1 is such a cause. It follows that  “all the causal work” 
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that is required for the   occurrence of P2 is accomplished by the occurrence of P1. 
Moreover, once P2 occurs, it guarantees the occurrence of M2 in virtue of the 
supervenience relationship between P2 and M2.  Thus P1 is by itself sufficient for M2 . It 
thus appears that there is nothing “left over” for M1 to do in the way of causing M2.   Put 
slightly differently,  the argument is that given the causal relationship between P1 and P2,  
it is unnecessary and superfluous to suppose that  in addition  there is a also a causal 
relationship between M1   and M2 ; indeed if we were to draw an arrow from M1 to M2 we 
would be introducing an implausible kind of “over-determination” into our picture of the 
relationships among P1, P2, M1 and M2. M2 and P2 would be over-determined by two sets 
of causes: P1 and M1.  Yet another way of putting the argument is in terms of a claim 
about what it is appropriate to “control for” or “hold fixed” in assessing the causal impact 
of M1: since P1 is an alternative cause of M2, we must hold   P1 fixed  in assessing 
whether M1 causes M2 When we  do so we see that M1 has no causal impact on M2 under 
this condition. Similar arguments can be deployed to support the conclusion that M1 does 
not cause P2 .  
We thus seem lead to the conclusion that M1 is causally inert, with all of the real 
causal action taking place at the level of P1  and P2.  Moreover, if the above arguments 
are correct, this conclusion seems to generalize to all of the special sciences: to the extent 
that non-reductive physicalism is the right account of the relationship between the states 
or properties that figure in sciences like biology, economics or psychology and the 
underlying physical realizations of these, then strictly speaking there are no causal 
relationships among these states and no true causal generalizations relating them.   
 
3. 
 
 Like Peter, I think that this conclusion is mistaken and that an interventionist 
approach to causation can give us some insight into why it is mistaken.  In this section I 
briefly reprise my version of the interventionist account  and lay the groundwork for  its 
application to the exclusion problem.   
In the version of interventionism presented in my 2003, a number of different 
causal notions are distinguished and characterized. However, as far as the exclusion 
problem goes, it will be sufficient to make use of a simple, generic notion of causation.  
Assume that we have a set of variables V  representing   properties or states that stand in 
causal relationships.  Variables are capable of taking a range of different “values” which 
in this context we may think of corresponding to more specific properties or their 
absence.  For example, we might think of the variable R as possessing two possible 
values which correspond to the presence of absence of the color red.   Initially I will 
assume that the variables  with which we are concerned    are “fully distinct” in the sense 
that they are not connected by  dependency relations that are non-causal in nature.  I  
include in this category relationships that hold for  logical,  conceptual, or mathematical 
relationships  as well as  supervenience relationships.    I take the mark of the presence of  
non-causal dependency relations  among a set of values V to be that the values of some of 
the variables   impose constraints on the possible values  that can be taken by some of  
the other variables,  but not because of causal relations among those variables (Cf. 
condition IF below) .  In other words, certain combinations of values for the variables in 
V are “impossible”, but not because of causal relations among those variables.  For 
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example,  if we have a variable X one of whose values is   “saying hello” and another 
variable Y one of whose values is “saying hello loudly” , then Y’s taking this value 
constrains the value taken by X, but in a non-causal way.    Similarly if  a variable M 
supervenes on a variable P, then certain combinations of values for P and M are ruled out 
as “metaphysically impossible.   Later I will relax this assumption of  non-distinctness, in 
order to deal with structures in which supervenience relations are present.  
Given variables that satisfy the requirement of distinctness, we  can characterize 
what it is for X to cause Y as follows: 
 
   (M ) X causes Y if and only if there is a possible intervention on X such that if 
that intervention were to occur, the value of Y or the probability distribution of Y would 
change.  
 
We can also characterize a closely related notion of a variable X taking a certain 
value X=x  causing a second variable Y to take a value Y=y as follows:  
 
 (M*) X=x causes Y=y if  and only if there is a possible intervention on X that 
changes the value of X so that X ≠ x such that if that intervention were to occur, the value 
of Y  would change to Y ≠ y.  
 
  The intuitive notion of an intervention on X is that of an unconfounded 
experimental manipulation of X which  is of such a character that if  an association 
between X and Y remains after this manipulation, this  shows that X causes Y.  In effect, 
the intervention “controls for” other possible sources of  association between X and Y 
besides whatever association is due to X’s causing Y.   I will assume that  an intervention  
I on X brings X   completely under the control of I so that I  “breaks”  any previously 
existing causal connections directed into X, supplying X with an independent, exogenous 
causal history—a consequence that my be represented graphically as the severing of 
previously holding or endogenous edges directed into X
1
.   Since the  details  will  matter 
for my later discussion, I quote from my (2003):   
 
(IV) I is an intervention variable for X with respect to Y iff 
1. I causes X; 
2. I acts as a switch for all other variables that cause X. That is, certain 
values of I are such that when I attains those values, X ceases to depend 
on the values of other variables that cause X and instead depends 
only on the value taken by I; 
3. Any directed path from I to Y goes through X. That is, I does not 
directly cause Y and is not a cause of any causes of Y that are distinct 
                                                 
1  This assumption is made for convenience and may be relaxed by replacing  the 
notion of an “arrow-breaking” intervention with the notion of a “soft intervention”, 
which merely supplies the variable intervened on with an exogenous source of 
variation, but does not break previously existing causal connections.  See Eberhardt 
and Scheines, 2007 for details.  The arguments below will go through, mutatis mutandis, 
with this weaker notion of intervention.  
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from X except, of course, for those causes of Y , if any, that are built 
into the I  X  Y connection itself; that is, except for (a) any causes 
of Y that are effects of X (i.e., variables that are causally between X 
and Y ) and (b) any causes of Y that are between I and X and have no 
effect on Y independently of X; 
4. I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z that causes Y and that 
is on a directed path that does not go through X. (Woodward 2003, 98)  
 
The references to “directed paths” and so on refer to causal graphs in which a 
direct causal relation from X to Y is represented by means of an arrow from X to Y 
(XY).  Woodward (2003) shows how one may characterize a notion of direct causation 
(and hence causal graphs) in interventionist terms;  the details of this will not matter in 
what follows.  
  I will assume in what follows that  if we are dealing with variables that do not 
stand in non-causal dependency relations, arrow-breaking interventions are possible on 
each variable in the graph—that is, that we can set any variable   to any of its possible 
values  via an intervention independently of the values taken by variables elsewhere in 
the graph.   I will call this the assumption of Independent Fixability of values:   
 
(IF):   A set of variables V satisfies independent fixability of values if and only if   
for each value it is possible for a variable to take individually, it is possible (that 
is possible in terms of  assumed definitional, logical or metaphysical relations)  to 
set the variable to that value via an intervention, concurrently with each of the 
other variables in V also being set to any of its individually possible values by 
independent interventions.  
 
We may think of satisfaction (IF) as a necessary condition for a graph to count as a 
causal graph – that is a  graph relating variables that may stand in causal relations but do 
not  stand in  any relations of non-causal dependency.   A structure in which  some 
variables stand in non-causal dependency relations  (such as supervenience relations, as 
in Kim’s diagram)  will not satisfy IF and will not be a causal graph.   
As I have observed elsewhere (M) (and M*) characterize  a rather weak notion of 
causation—  (M)  implies that X causes Y as long as there  is some change in the value of 
X that leads to a change in the value of (or the probability distribution of) Y  and parallel 
remarks apply to (M*).  As formulated, (M) and (M*) say nothing about which changes 
in X lead to changes in Y.  One simple way of making (some of) this information explicit 
employs “rather than” or similar locutions to capture the contrastive structure of causal 
claims:   
(M**) X=x  rather  than  X=x’ causes Y=y rather than Y=y’ (where x≠x” and y≠y’ 
of course)  if  and only if there is a possible intervention on X that changes the value of X 
from X=x to X=   such that if that intervention were to occur, the value of Y  would 
change from y  to y’.   
    I will say more about this issue in section 7 below, when I compare my view 
with Peter’s. 
 
4.   
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  If we adopt the understanding of causation embodied in (M-M*),  and if  neglect 
any  possible complications  arising from the  supervenience of the mental on the 
physical,  there   appears to be no problem with attributing causal efficacy to mental 
states and properties. All that is required for  a mental property M1 to cause another 
mental property M2 or to cause  behavior B is that there be values of M1 such that are 
possible interventions that change M1 from one of those values to the other and such that 
under those interventions the values of M2 or B change.  Prima-facie at least,  it looks as 
though this requirement is often met: it appears we often intervene on one another’s 
mental states  -- for example,  when we successfully persuade or threaten some one in 
such a way as to change  their beliefs and desires in such a way that the upshot is changes 
in other mental states or behavior? To the extent this is so, we have mental causation 
according to  (M) and (M*).  
  It has been argued by several writers (Baumgartner, 2009, 2010, Marcellesi, 
forthcoming), however,  that this conclusion is undermined when  we add back in the 
consideration that we have so far been neglecting:  the supervenience of the mental on the  
physical and the way in which this interacts with the interventionist framework.  In what 
follows I focus on Baumartner’s version of this objection since his is the most fully 
developed.  Focusing again on Kim’s diagram, Baumgartner’s argument is that far from 
supporting the claim that M1 causes P2 , interventionism is actually inconsistent with this 
claim. (I focus on  the M1 P2 relationship in order to follow Baumgartner’s exposition, 
but  I think, in contrast to Baumgartner that if his  objection is valid, it  also rules out 
causation form M1 to M2 .  Baumgartner’s reasoning is as follows: Consider (IV). This 
requires that an intervention on X with respect to Y change the value of X in a way that is 
statistically independent of all other causes of Y that are not on a path from X to Y.  
Suppose one attempts to intervene on M1 with respect to P2.  Then (Baumgartner claims) 
in Kim’s diagram   P1 is such an off-path variable which is a cause of  P2. Moreover, it is 
built into the nature of the supervenience relation that M1 cannot change in value without 
a change in P1. But then it is impossible to change M1 in a way that it is statistically 
independent of P1 (or to change M1 with P1 being held fixed). Hence, according to 
Baumgartner, it is impossible to intervene on M1 with respect to P2.   If there is no such 
possible intervention on M1, then according to the interventionist account of causation, 
M1 cannot cause P2, since M requires that for such causation, interventions on M1 must 
be possible. A similar line of reasoning seems to lead to the conclusion that M1 cannot 
cause M2 . In effect,  Baumgartner’s argument is that (IV) requires that  in assessing the 
causal efficacy of M1, one hold fixed or control for its supervenience base,  and that this 
requirement implies that M1 cannot cause M2 (or  P2) .  
In assessing these contentions, there are two  issues that should be kept separate. 
One is an interpretive issue about what IV as formulated in  Woodward, 2003 requires. 
The other, far more interesting issue is whether, regardless of what IV implies, one ought 
to “control for”  supervenience bases in assessing the causal efficacy of supervening 
variables.   
  As far as the  interpretive issue goes, Baumgartner’s claims about what IV 
requires seem mistaken  As explained above, IV is intended to apply to systems of causal 
relationships satisfying IF – that is, to causal graphs constructed according to the rules 
(governing direct causation etc.) given in  Woodward, 2003.  Baumgartner apparently 
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assumes that Kim’s diagram is such a causal graph for the purposes of applying (IV) and 
that P1 is the relevant sense, an “off-path variable “in such a graph. But this is  not what 
IV says, assuming (as virtually everyone involved in this discussion, including 
Baumgartner, agrees) that supervenience relationship represented by the double-tailed 
arrow is   a non-causal dependency relationship.   IV says nothing about controlling for 
variables that are “off-path” in the sense that they  stand in non-causal  supervenience 
relations to  the variable intervened on .  Instead, in the context of IV,  “off path”  means  
“variable that is off-path in the  causal graph  that represents the causal structure of the 
system of interest”.  P1 is not an off-path variable in this sense.   So if we simply follow 
the letter of IV, we should not understand it as requiring  that an intervention on M1 must 
hold fixed the value of P1.  
Of course, this leaves open  the  possibility that IV  is simply mistaken  and that 
contrary to what it implies one ought to control for supervenience bases or at least that 
such control is required by the overall commitments of interventionism.   After all,  it 
might be said, interventionists agree that one should “control for” some other causes of Y 
in assessing whether X causes Y. Why shouldn’t these “other causes of Y”  that need to be 
controlled for include the supervenience basis SB (X) for X, as the exclusion argument 
claims?  If so, we should reformulate IV and other elements of the interventionist 
framework in such a way that  they require  such control.  In the following section I 
address this issue.  
 
     5. 
 
I think that there are several reasons why  one should not control for 
supervenience bases in assessing the causal role of supervening variables.  First, the 
arguments and considerations that support requirements for controlling for the effects of 
appropriate “other causes” (as detailed in IV and  M- M*) when all of the relationships 
represented in the graph are  between distinct variables and no non-causal dependency 
relations  are present  do not transfer to contexts in which non-causal relations of 
dependence are present.  That is, it is a mistake (indeed one might say that it is the central 
mistake made by advocates of the exclusion argument)  to assume that because it would 
be appropriate, in assessing the causal impact of M1 on M2, to control for or hold fixed 
variable P1 in Kim’s diagram in contexts in which P1 causes M1, it must also be 
appropriate to do this in contexts in which the relationship between P1 and M1 is one of 
non-causal supervenience.   A second consideration is that  control for supervenience 
bases leads to what,  intuitively speaking, are   mistaken   causal inferences. In the 
absence  of any positive reasons for such control, we should not require it.    
Let me begin with the first point.  Suppose that we are dealing with a structure 
like that in Kim’s diagram but in which the double headed arrows are all replaced by 
single arrows representing causal relations—that is,  P1 causes M1 and P2 causes M2 (and 
P1  causes P2 as before). In  this sort of structure, if we wish to assess whether M1 causes 
M2, there is an obvious rationale for controlling for the presence of such other causes of 
M2 as P1 and P2. This is because even if M1 does not cause M2 , the operation of P1 may 
produce a “spurious association”  between M1 and M2 in virtue of the fact that P1 causes 
M1 and causes M2 via P1.  In this case, on the interventionist picture, a properly 
performed experiment  (an intervention which satisfies IV) for assessing whether M1 
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causes M2 will be one which  “breaks” the causal connection from P1 to M1, supplying M1 
with some independent source of variation besides P1.   If M1 and M2  remain correlated 
under this intervention, M1 has an independent causal impact on M2. If not, M1 does not 
cause M2 and their association is spurious.  Here the notion of a spurious association has 
a clear meaning and a clear practical import. When the relation between P1 and M1 is 
causal, it follows from (IF) that  it is causally possible for M1 to occur in the absence of 
P1 --  indeed this is what happens when an intervention on M1 occurs.   In such a 
situation, if the association between M1 and M2 is spurious, the association between M1 
and M2 will disappear.   In this case,  the test for  whether M1 causes M2 or instead their 
relation is spurious  has to do with what will  happen to M2 if one were in fact to  
manipulate M1. 
 When M1 supervenes on P1 the logic of the situation is quite different. In this 
case, by hypotheis,  it is “metaphysically impossible” to break the relationship between 
P1 and M1 in the sense of changing M1 independently of changing P1 or supplying M1 
with a source of variation that is independent of P1 . Instead of arguing, as we do in the 
case in which P1 M1 relation is causal, that M1 does not cause M2  (or P1) on the 
grounds that if  were we to change M1 independently of P1, there would be no change in 
M2 (or P1), any conclusion we reach about the causal inertness of M1 when M1 supervenes 
on P1 is instead based on the impossibility of changing M1 without changing P1.  That is,  
we in effect conclude that M1 is causally inert from the impossibility of changing M1 
while holding P1 fixed.  By contrast, in the case in which the relation between P1 and M1 
is causal, we reason to the causal  inertness of M1 on the  assumption that it is possible to 
change M1 independently of P1 and that under such a change M2 would not change .   
  In circumstances in which the supervenience of M1 on P1 makes it impossible to 
change M1 without changing P1,   the claim that  any association between M1 and M2 (or  
between M1 and P2) is  “spurious” or non-causal does not have the significance or 
implications that it has in cases in which P1 causes M1 and also acts via some independent 
path as a cause of P2 or M2.  When the presence of a supervenience relation assures us 
that  it is impossible to change M1 without changing P1, we don’t have to worry about the 
possibility of situations arising in   which P1 causes M2, M1 does not,  and in which we or 
nature alter M1 but P1 remains unchanged leading to no change in M2 or P2. Instead, any 
change in M1 must also at the same time change P1 and whatever downstream effects of 
P1 result from this change. So we  don’t have to worry about the kind of possibility that 
arises in more ordinary cases in which the association  between M1 and M2 is spurious, 
which does carry with it the implication that attempting to exploit the relationship 
between M1 and M2 will simply cause the association between M1 and M2 to disappear.  
To drive this last point home, consider the following contrast.   Researcher 1 is 
interested in whether administration A of a drug   produces recovery R from a certain 
disease.  She is worried that the  previously observed  association between A and R may 
be spurious and in particular due to the fact that the drug has been given preferentially to  
healthier patients with better immune response, where the goodness of immune response 
is measured by a variable I.  Researcher 1 does a randomized control trial (which among 
other things, balances values of I across the treatment and control group)    and finds an 
association between A and R.  She takes  this to be strong evidence against the possibility 
that the A-R association is spurious.   
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 This conclusion is challenged by researcher 2 on the following grounds:  The  
values of A ( whether or not the drug is  administered) for any individual patient   
supervene  on certain microphysical features  P having to do with the molecular structure 
of the drug, whether these are present in the patient’s body etc. Assuming that non-
reductive physicalism is the correct picture   of the relation between P and A, these 
features P are  a possible cause of recovery which is distinct from A. Hence (following 
the logic of the exclusion argument)  in order to  demonstrate that  A really causes 
recovery, one would have to do an experiment in which A is manipulated while P is held 
fixed.   Researcher 2 notes that given the nature of the supervenience relation any such 
experiment is impossible and infers from this impossibility that A cannot cause recovery.    
On any generally accepted conception of experimental methodology, there is a 
difference in the cogency of the reasoning of the two researchers.   Researcher 1 reasons 
from  the results of an actually performed experiment.  Researcher 2 reasons to a 
conclusion about  the causal inertness of A on the basis of the impossibility of performing 
a certain experiment.  The worry about spuriousness addressed by the first experimenter 
is a live, practical worry—if the previously observed association between A and R is due 
entirely to the fact that the drug has been given differentially to those with stronger 
immune systems, then administering the drug is not an effective strategy for promoting 
recovery, a fact that would soon be discovered if the drug were given to populations of 
patients in which A and immune response I are not correlated.  No similar worry is being 
addressed by the second researcher. Since anyone who receives the drug  must also 
satisfy  some appropriate version of the microphysical description   P and  by hypothesis 
P causes recovery, there is no possibility that anyone to whom the drug is administered 
will fail to have a higher probability of recovery.  While I is an alternative cause of 
recovery that is independent of A in the sense that I can fail to be correlated with A (or 
indeed can  have  any arbitrary  correlation with A  between 0 and 1),  the corresponding 
claim is not true of the relation between A and P since these variables cannot fail to be 
correlated—the exclusion argument’s judgment that A does not “really” cause recovery 
does not  license any corresponding worry that  manipulating A will fail to be a successful 
strategy for  promoting recovery.   This is reflected in the fact that,  as a matter of 
ordinary scientific methodology, the randomized trial described above is commonly 
regarded as  one of the best possible sources of evidence  for whether A causes recovery; 
that  the causal exclusion  argument  conflicts with this judgment is an indication of the 
extent to which it relies on assumptions about causation and causal inference that are 
inconsistent with those ordinarily  made about experimental design.  
  Yet another consideration in favor of this conclusion is suggested by how it 
seems appropriate to reason in analogous cases involving logical or mathematical 
dependency. Suppose, following  Spirtes and Scheines, 2005 that we have a graph (not a 
causal graph)  containing variables representing total cholesterol (TC), high density 
cholesterol (HDL) and low density cholesterol (LDL) where as a matter of definition, 
TC= LDL+ HDL.  Suppose we are interested in the effect of these variables on a health-
outcome variable H.   Consider the following reasoning: both LDL and TC are (or may 
imagined to be) causes of H. Therefore, in assessing the effect of HDL on H, we should 
hold fixed the values of LDL and TC. Of course we find that it is impossible, for 
definitional reasons, to manipulate HDL while holding fixed LDL and TC. Therefore, it is 
impossible to intervene on HDL and we conclude that  HDL has no effect on H.  
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This reasoning seems perverse. The (definitionally grounded) impossibility of 
manipulating HDL while holding LDL and TC fixed is not a good reason for concluding 
that HDL is causally inert with respect to H.  Intuitively, it seems unreasonable to 
demand that the notion of an intervention on HDL be understood in such a way that this 
requires changing HDL while holding fixed LDL and TC. Instead, it seems much more 
natural to understand the notion of an intervention in this context as operating in such a 
way that an intervention  that changes HDL by amount ∆HDL will at the same time 
amount to (that is, it is the same intervention as)  an intervention that changes TC by 
amount ∆ HDL. Moreover,  in determining the effect of HDL on H, we need to avoid 
“double counting” of the effects of the same intervention twice. If we  draw arrows from 
HDL to H and from TC to H to represent causal relations and,  say,  a double-tailed  
arrow from HDL to TC to represent definitional dependence, then it is a mistake to reason 
that if HDL is changed by ∆HDL, this will also change TC by ∆ HDL, with the result that 
the change in H will reflect the change in both of these variables – a    change in H due to 
HDL and an additional  similar change due in H due to   TC. Instead, when   an 
intervention occurs on HDL there is just one change of magnitude ∆HDL which affects 
H. 
The supervenience relation thought to be present in non-reductive physicalism is 
of course not the same as mathematical/definitional relation present in the  cholesterol 
example. Nonetheless the same basic points concerning causal inference seem to apply. 
When logical/mathematical relations are present, it seems uncontroversial that we will 
make mistaken causal inferences if we attempt to “control for” variables that are related 
as a matter of definition. That is, we get into difficulties when we treat non-causal 
relations of definitional dependency as though they are ordinary causal relations, and 
import demands for control and holding fixed that are appropriate to the latter  into the 
former context. I claim that  parallel points apply when supervenient relations are present.   
 
        6. 
 
These considerations seem to support the conclusion that one should not control 
for  (condition on) supervenience bases in assessing the causal efficacy of supervening 
properties but they do not  give us a positive account of how we should think about 
interventions and causal relations in structures in which supervenience or other sorts of 
non-causal dependency relations are present. A full account of this sort is beyond the 
scope of this essay but let me suggest a few principles which  will play a role  later in my 
discussion. 
First, in parallel with the treatment of definitional dependence above, when  
supervience relations are present, an intervention on   X should be treated as 
automatically changing (indeed as also  the same intervention on) the supervenience base 
SB(X) of X, with SB(X) changing in whatever way is required by the supervenience 
relation between X and SB (X) (or  as changing in some way or other that is consistent 
with the supervenience relation if there are multiple possibilities). For example, an 
intervention  that changes the value of some variable M representing a mental property, 
should be treated as at the same time changing the value of the physical variable P on 
which it supervenes.  
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 Second, and consistently with this, when an intervention occurs on X, its 
supervenience base SB(X) should not be regarded as one of those “off route causes” in IV 
that one needs to control for or hold fixed in intervening on X. To be more explicit,  when   
supervenience relationships are present,  the characterization   IV  should be interpreted 
in such a way that  in  condition (I3)  a directed path counts as “going  from I to Y 
through X” even if I also changes (as it must) the supervenience base SB (X) of X, as well 
as the value of X. Similarly,  the reference in (I4)  to “any variable Z” should be  
interpreted as “any variable Z other than those in the supervenience base SB(X) of X”.  
Put slightly differently the requirements in the definition (IV) should be understood as 
applying only to  those variables that are causally related to  X and Y or  are correlated 
with them but and not to those variables that are related to X and Y as a result of 
supervenience  relations or relations of definitional dependence. 
Third and again consistently in applying  the characterization (M) (and for that 
matter the  characterizations of other causal notions in Woodward, 2003) we should 
consider as well-defined only those  interventions  or combinations  of interventions that 
involve setting variables to combinations of values that  are “co-possible” in the sense of 
satisfying whatever non-causal dependency relations are assumed to be present.  
Combinations  of “interventions” that are “impossible” in the sense of violating whatever 
non causal dependency relations are  assumed to be present are not well-defined 
interventions, and claims about what would happen under such impossible 
“interventions” have no bearing, one way or another, on which causal relations obtain. In 
other words, in assessing whether  X causes  Y  we should consider only possible 
interventions on X  (and where relevant other variables), where “possible” here means 
consistent with whatever non-causal dependency relations are assumed)  and ask whether   
Y would change  under any of these interventions.   
Finally, because interventions on some variables may amount to interventions on 
other  variables to which they bear non-causal dependency relations,  we need to take 
account of this fact in tracking causal relationships, so that we avoid double-counting. 
To illustrate these ideas, let me apply them to a structure like that in Kim’s 
diagram but with some additional assumptions made explicit.  Suppose that we think of  
N1,  N2, M1,  and M2 as variables, with the values of M1  and M2 supervening on values of 
N1 and N2 respectively. In particular, M1 can take two different values- m11 and m12. N1 
can take three different values, with n11 and n12 realizing m11 and n13 realizing m12. M2 
can take values m21 and m22, with n21 and n22  being  different realizations of m21  and n23 
realizing m22. Suppose that n11 leads to n21, n12 leads to n22, and n13 leads to n23, so that 
m11 is followed by m21 and m12  is followed by m23.  Then N1 causes N2 because there is a 
change in the value of N1 (from e.g.  n12   to n13) that  when produced by an intervention is 
associated with a change in N2 (from n22 to n23).  It can also easily be checked that M1 
causes M2, and that N1 causes M2 and M1 causes N2.  So under these assumptions  the  
associated causal graph looks like this (with supervenience relations omitted) :  
 
M1                 M2  
 
 
P1                           P2 
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            Figure 2 
 
 In interpreting this graph, we need to take care to follow the conventions 
described above and to avoid double counting.    For example, when an intervention  I 
changes M1  from m11 to m12, we should think of this intervention as at the same time 
producing a consistent change in N1 (e.g. from n11 to n13). And in assessing the causal 
impact of this change on M2 we need to avoid counting it twice, as two independent 
changes in M2 , one of which occurs along the M1—> M2 route and the other through the 
N1 N2 -- M2 route. Instead there is just one intervention on M1/ N1 and just one 
associated change in M2.   Finally,  it is important to bear in mind what an arrow from, 
say, M1 to M2 means within the interventionist framework: all that it means is that there 
are possible interventions on M1 that will change M2. There is no inconsistency between 
this claim and the claim that interventions on M1 will also  change N2, interventions on N1 
will change M2 and so on. The arrows from M1 to M2 and to N2, do not mean that there 
are independent, separately disruptable causal processes linking M1 to M2 and linking M1 
to N2,.  
Before leaving this example, let me make a further observation about Kim’s 
diagram and about the exclusion argument which I hope will illustrate the power of the 
interventionist framework and the way in which it can afford novel insights.  Both 
adherents and critics of the exclusion argument often seem to suppose that the 
information explicitly represented in Kim’s diagram  (that N1 causes N2, M1 supervenes 
on N1,  M2 supervenes on N2)  is enough to “fix” or determine the overall pattern of 
association between M1 and M2, with the only  question being whether this association 
should be regarded as causal.  Within a broadly interventionist framework, this 
assumption is mistaken. The information explicitly represented in the diagram does not 
even determine whether M1 and M2 are correlated or instead independent, when causal 
claims are understood along interventionist lines.  
As one possible illustration of how this may happen, consider the following 
variation on the example immediately above. As before, M1 has two possible values, m11 
and m12.  M1 supervenes on N1,  which now has four  possible values n11, n12, n13 and n14. 
m11 may be realized by either  of the values n11,  n12 and  m12 may be realized by either 
n13 or n14.  M2 has two possible values m21 and m22. M2 supervenes on N2, with possible 
values n21, n22, n23 and n24.  n21 and n22 are the realizers of m21 and n 23 and n24 are the 
realizers of m22. The causal relationship linking N1 to N2, is such that  the values n11, n12, 
and n13 are followed by n21 and the value n14 is followed by n22.   This counts as a causal 
relationship between N1 and N2 within the interventionist framework   since  there are 
interventions that  change  N1  (e.g., from    n11 to n14 ) that are followed by changes in N2 
(from n21 to n22).   However,  it is easily verified that changes in M1 from m11 to m12 (or 
vice-versa) are not associated with (do not lead to) changes in M2. This is because all of 
the realizations of the different possible values of M1 lead via the pattern of dependence 
of N2 on N1 to realizations of the same value of M2 (namely m21).  
This example illustrates how different accounts of causation   (and in particular 
whether one thinks of causation in terms of something like nomological sufficiency or 
instead along interventionist lines)  have different  implications for how one interprets 
and assess the exclusion argument.   In Kim’s diagram, any particular occurrence of a 
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value of M1 will   have some physical realizer – say n11-- which is a value of N1.  If we 
interpret the claim that N1 causes N2 as implying simply that this  realizer n11  is 
nomologically sufficient for whatever value is taken by N2  then,  in virtue of the 
supervenience relation between N2 and M2, n11 is also  sufficient for the value taken by 
M2 on this occasion. However,   it does not follow that the values taken by M2 causally 
depend on the values of M1 in the sense that there are different possible values of M1 
which will lead to different values of M2, or that changing  the value of M1 is a way of 
changing the value of M2, which is the notion of causation the interventionist account 
attempts to capture.  Nomological sufficiency is different from causal dependence, as 
many other examples in the explanation literature illustrate
2
.    
 This in turn has an important additional consequence. Since (when causation is 
understood along interventionist lines)  in some cases in which N1 causes N2 and  the 
supervenience relations in Kim’s diagram  are present,  M1 will  cause  M2  and in other 
cases  of this sort M1 will not cause M2, we convey important additional information 
when we draw or omit to draw an arrow from M1 to M2.  Whether M2 changes under an 
intervention on M1 when interventions are understood along the lines described above, 
depends not just on whether N1 causes N2 and M1 (M2) supervenes on N1 (N2) but on the 
further  details of the way in which these variables are related to one another, matters 
which are not specified in Kim’s diagram.  So in this sense, the suggestion in standard 
formulations of the exclusion argument that it is redundant or superfluous to suppose that 
M1 causes M2, given the other information in Kim’s diagram, is mistaken.    
 
7. 
 
  Peter  and Christian List   are also critical  of the exclusion argument, on grounds 
that have some similarity to but are nonetheless distinct from those advanced above.  
Their argument  relies on the idea that  causes are “proportional difference makers”  for 
their effects. They propose the following “truth conditions” for a property  F “making a 
difference” to a second property G: 
 
(P) The presence of F makes a  difference to the presence of G in  the actual 
world if and only if it is true in the actual world that (i) F is present > G is present 
and (ii) F is absent > G is absent. ( List and Menzies, 2009,  here > is the 
counterfactual conditional) 
 
 They then argue as follows: Consider (following Woodward, 2008)  the claim 
possession of an intention I1 causes a monkey to perform action A1. Suppose that I1 is 
“realized” on this particular occasion by some neural structure N11  but because I1 is 
multiply realizable, it might also have been realized by neural structure N12.   It is 
plausible  that  (or at least the situation may be imagined to be one in which) the 
following two counterfactuals are true: 
 
(1a) If I1 were present, then A1 would be present 
(2a) If I1 were not present, then A1 would not be present  
                                                 
2
  Cf. Salmon’s (1984) example about the male who takes birth control pills.  
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Thus  the presence of I1  is a difference-maker for A1 .  
 
Now compare: 
  
(1b) If N11 were present, A1 would be present 
(2b) If N11 were not present, A1 would not be present  
 
Menzies  and List  claim that (2b) is false, on the following grounds: At least some 
worlds that are “closest” to the actual world in which N11  fails to occur will be worlds in 
which an alternative realizer N12 of I1  occurs.   In these worlds, A1 will occur, rendering  
(2b) false. They conclude that under these conditions, with “causes” understood as  
“difference-makers” in the sense captured by (P),  that  the claim   
 
  (3) I1 causes A1  
 
is true and the claim  
   
(4) N11 causes A1 
 
 is false.  We thus have a case of what Menzies and List call “downward exclusion”,  in  
which the  truth of the “upper level” causal claim (3) excludes the truth of the lower level 
claim (4).  
  As explained above, my view is different from this.  Switching from property-
talk to variable-talk,   call the relevant neural variable N  (where N takes values  
corresponding to n11= presence of N11, n12 = presence of N12 etc.)   and   the action 
variable A (its  values include, say,  presence of A1 and  presence of A2).  Then  as long as 
there are some possible changes in the value of N which,  when produced by 
interventions, are associated with changes in A ,  (4)  will be true.  (4) will be true if, for 
example, N has (in addition to its values n11 and n12) a value n13 = presence of N13 that 
leads to  the absence of A1. Then, because a change in N from n11 to n13 leads to a change  
from  the presence of A1 to  the absence of A1, N11 causes A1. If, in addition, N11 and N12 
are the only two realizers of I1, it will also be true that I1 causes A1.  On my view, under 
these conditions,  there is neither downward nor upward exclusion.   
          As remarked at the end of Section 3, I agree that there is an important respect in 
which (4) by itself is less perspicuous or informative than one would like: it fails to tell us 
under specifically which alternatives to N11,  A1 would occur or fail to occur.  One might 
remedy this by specifying explicitly what the pattern of dependence of A on N is – by, for 
example, using the “rather than” locution along the lines of (M**): the occurrence N11, 
rather than N13 caused  A1 rather than A2 but if N12 rather than N11, had occurred, A1 (still) 
would have occurred.  Or, more simply, one might simply specify what would happen to 
the A variable under each of the three values that N can take.  Call this causal claim (6).   
I see no obvious   reason to regard (6)  as inferior   in terms of informativeness to (3), the 
claim that attributes causal efficacy to the intention I1 and certainly   no reason to think 
that (6) is false and (3) true.  This suggests to me that  it is wrong to suppose that in the 
example as described there is, so to speak, no causation of A1 going on at the neural level 
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characterized by  N . Rather what is going on is simply that (4) by itself, is less 
informative and perspicuous than one might like, when compared with (3), a problem that 
can be remedied by spelling out (4) along the lines of (6).    
I will add that I agree with Menzies and List that the counterfactual  (2b) is false, 
although my grounds for thinking that it is false are different from theirs
3
.  But the more 
important point, from my point of view, is  that  the truth of ( 2b) is not a necessary 
condition for the truth of  (2). As claimed above, the truth of (2) requires only that some 
counterfactual of the form “If N were to take a different value from n11 (or if N were to 
take value N13 rather than n11) then A1 would not occur” be true. Indeed if we were to 
require, as a necessary condition for the truth of causal claims, that  the second 
counterfactual in (P) be true, a very large number of causal claims that we ordinarily take 
to be true would turn out to be false
4
.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 This issue deserves more attention than I can give it here, but very roughly I do not 
think that it matters in evaluating (2b) whether some or all of the worlds  in which  N11 
does not occur and which are closest to the actual world are worlds in which A1 does not 
occur.  On my view, (2b)  is false if any of the realizers of its antecedent  (regardless of 
their closeness to their actuality in comparison with other realizers)  are followed by the 
occurrence of A1 . Thus  to argue that (2b) is false, we do not need to show, as Menzies 
and List attempt to do,  that some worlds in which N11 does not occur are worlds in which 
N12 occurs instead. The falsity of (2b) does not require that counterfactuals of the form  
“if N11 had not occurred, then such and such an alternative to N11 would (or even might) 
have occurred” be true.  One way in which this issue matters concerns the validity of the 
inference from (AvB) > C to (A>C). (B>C). I take this inference to be valid within an 
interventionist framework; I believe that Menzies’ and List’s treatment follows Lewis in 
judging it to be invalid.      
4
  Consider a variant on Glymour’s  (1986) example of S, who smokes 4 packs of 
cigarettes a day and develops lung cancer.   Assume that if S had smoked any amount in 
excess of 2 packs, S would have developed lung cancer. Is it true that (7) S’s smoking 4 
packs a day caused his lung cancer? Applying (P) and evaluating counterfactuals in the 
way List and Menzies suggest, (7) comes out false, since S will develop lung cancer in 
close-by worlds, such as those in which he smokes 3.9 packs. I find it more natural to 
follow (M) in regarding claims like (7) as true, albeit less informative than one might 
like. In general,   it seems that our usual practice is not to follow (P) in requiring that  for 
C causes E to be true, the counterfactual  (8) “if C had not occurred, then E would not 
have occurred” must be true, at least when this counterfactual is evaluated in the way that 
Menzies and List suggest.   It is worth  noting in this connection that Lewis (1986) tells 
us that in evaluating the counterfactual   “if C had not occurred, then E would not have 
occurred” in connection with the claim “C causes E” we would should consider worlds in 
which C is “wholly excised”, rather than worlds which, so to speak, involve very small 
departures from C.   Presumably this means that the relevant counterfactual for evaluating 
(7)is one whose antecedent has S not smoking at all (or smoking very little) rather than 
smoking 3.9 packs, which in turn leads to (7) be regarded as true in Lewis’ framework. I 
am grateful to Chris Hitchcock for helpful discussion of this issue.  
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